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Abstract— A cyber-physical system (CPS) is expected to be
resilient to more than one type of adversary. In this paper, we
consider a CPS that has to satisfy a linear temporal logic (LTL)
objective in the presence of two kinds of adversaries. The first
adversary has the ability to tamper with inputs to the CPS
to influence satisfaction of the LTL objective. The interaction
of the CPS with this adversary is modeled as a stochastic
game. We synthesize a controller for the CPS to maximize the
probability of satisfying the LTL objective under any policy of
this adversary. The second adversary is an eavesdropper who
can observe labeled trajectories of the CPS generated from
the previous step. It could then use this information to launch
other kinds of attacks. A labeled trajectory is a sequence of
labels, where a label is associated to a state and is linked
to the satisfaction of the LTL objective at that state. We use
differential privacy to quantify the indistinguishability between
states that are related to each other when the eavesdropper
sees a labeled trajectory. Two trajectories of equal length will
be differentially private if they are differentially private at
each state along the respective trajectories. We use a skewed
Kantorovich metric to compute distances between probability
distributions over states resulting from actions chosen according
to policies from related states in order to quantify differential
privacy. Moreover, we do this in a manner that does not affect
the satisfaction probability of the LTL objective. We validate
our approach on a simulation of a UAV that has to satisfy an
LTL objective in an adversarial environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) consist of tightly coupled
cyber and physical components that work in conjunction with
algorithms and communication channels to satisfy complex
objectives in dynamic environments [1]. The objectives that
a CPS will need to meet often vary with time. Temporal
logic frameworks like linear temporal logic [2] enable the
specification of goals such as safety, stability, and reachabil-
ity. In applications like power systems [3] and automobiles
[4], the CPS must achieve its goals in scenarios that can be
manipulated by an adversary that can disrupt nominal oper-
ation [5]. Disruptions to power systems and water networks
can inconvenience large sections of the population.
An adversary may not have the ability to directly launch
attacks on the CPS. However, it could be capable of collect-
ing information about the system, which can then be used to
affect nominal operation [6]. Therefore, a well-designed sys-
tem must protect information critical to maintaining normal
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operation. Differential privacy [7] is a security property that
makes it difficult for an adversary to discern information
about a system by providing probabilistic guarantees on
the indistinguishabilty of observations of the system. This
technique was originally used to protect sensitive data of in-
dividuals in databases in a manner that allowed for statistical
analysis on aggregated information obtained from the data
[8]. It has since been used to protect information represented
as trajectories of a dynamical system [9], where differential
privacy was accomplished by adding a carefully calibrated
noise to sensitive trajectories so that an adversary could not
glean information about the modified trajectory. Recent work
has studied the enforcement of differential privacy on multi-
agent systems to meet a temporal logic objective [10], or to
minimize a quadratic cost [11].
We study differential privacy for systems represented
as discrete state, discrete-action Markov decision processes
(MDPs). Such systems encompass the operating environ-
ments of a broad range of practical systems, including robots
and UAVs [12], and are especially suited for experimental
analysis. In order to reason about trajectories that satisfy
an LTL formula, we work with PCTL∗, a probabilistic
computational tree logic which has LTL formulas as its path
formulas [2]. Two states will be differentially private if the
probabilities of satisfying a desired LTL objective starting
from these states are sufficiently close. A trajectory will be
differentially private if all states in the trajectory that are
generated according to some policy are differentially private.
In previous work that studied differential privacy for Markov
chains [13], [14], the treatment was restricted to ensuring
differential privacy of the initial state of the Markov chain.
In comparison, we study differential privacy of states in an
MDP along trajectories corresponding to satisfaction of an
LTL objective in the presence of an adversary.
Different from the aforementioned works, we consider
a setting with two kinds of adversaries that have different
capabilities, and act independently of each other. We are
interested in ensuring differential privacy of trajectories
against one adversary (E). At the same time, we want to
maximize the probability of satisfaction of the LTL objective
under actions of the other adversary (A). Specifically, we
assume that adversary A has the ability to inject signals to
affect the control inputs to the CPS thereby influencing the
transitions between CPS states. We would like to maximize
the probability of satisfying the LTL goal under any sequence
of actions played by this adversary. The interaction between
the CPS and A is modeled as a zero-sum game, and the
synthesis of a CPS policy that maximizes the probability
of satisfying the LTL goal under any adversary policy is
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related to reaching a Stackelberg equilibrium of this game.
Once this objective is accomplished, we want that trajectories
produced by the synthesized controller be indistinguishable
to the adversary E that can eavesdrop on these trajectories by
observing a sequence of labels associated to states along the
trajectories. That is, observing labeled trajectories should not
allow E to gain information about the state of the system.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
studies resilient control in the presence of an adversary along
with ensuring differential privacy of states along a trajectory
satisfying the LTL objective. Prior work has studied these
problems separately for a single kind of adversary (either an
adversary of type A or of type E).
A. Contributions
We solve the problem of satisfying an LTL objective in
the presence of an adversary that can tamper with actuator
inputs, while also ensuring that trajectories of the system
which satisfy the objective are differentially private to an
eavesdropper who can observe labels of states on these
trajectories. We make the following contributions:
• We show that the CPS policy that will maximize the
probability of satisfaction of the LTL objective under
any adversary policy is related to reaching certain sub-
sets of a Markov chain associated to representations of
the environment and the LTL goal under these policies.
• We use a fragment of the logic PCTL∗, whose se-
mantics are defined over MDPs, to reason about LTL
trajectories. Starting with a realization of the defender
policy that satisfies the LTL objective, we define a
symmetric relation on states and show that pairs of
states in this relation will be differentially private.
• We present a value-iteration procedure and show that if
a (skewed) distance between values of ‘related’ states is
below a threshold, then these states will be differentially
private. Two trajectories will be differentially private if
the initial states of the trajectories are related, and if
optimal defender policies from these states and all pairs
of subsequently related states are ‘close’ to each other.
• A case-study on the satisfaction of a reach-avoid speci-
fication for a UAV influenced by adversarial inputs in an
environment with an eavesdropper illustrates our results.
B. Outline of Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
summarizes related work, and we give a brief introduction to
LTL, stochastic games, and differential privacy in Section III.
We state our problem and detail the steps of our solution in
Sections IV and V. Section VI shows an example illustrating
our approach, and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The satisfaction of an LTL objective for two-player
stochastic games when the players had competing objectives
was presented in [15], [16] for the case when states were
fully observable and in [17], [18] for the partially observable
case. The authors of [19], [20] extended this to the case when
an adversary could tamper with both actuators and clocks of
the CPS to affect the satisfaction of a time-sensitive tem-
poral constraint. There, the same adversary was capable of
effecting both kinds of attacks on the system, which makes it
different from the assumptions made in this paper. Evaluating
multiple traces corresponding to different executions of a
system using hyperproperties [21] was proposed in [22]. The
authors proposed a temporal logic HyperPCTL, in order to
reason about probabilistic hyperproperties, and this approach
was studied in the context of verification for CPSs in [23].
The authors of [24], [25] presented a logical characteriza-
tion of differential privacy for labeled probabilistic transition
systems using a trace metric that corresponded to exact
differential privacy (δ = 0 in Definition 7). The authors of
[13], [14] computed distances that constituted sound upper
bounds on a skewed total variation distance between initial
states of a Markov chain. They used the Kantorovich metric
[26] to lift a distance between states to a distance between
probability distributions associated to these states. A large
part of this analysis was motivated by the work on defining
metrics for MDPs [27]–[29]. These metrics measured the
distance between states in MDPs with large state spaces and
then allowed aggregation of states that were ‘close’ to each
other. They further showed that for such states, the values of
the states were also ‘close’ to each other. Algorithms based
on Monte-Carlo methods were used to give guarantees on
the differential privacy of synthesized policies in [30].
Using differential privacy to protect information about
trajectories of dynamical systems was first presented in
[9]. Since then, it has been studied for privacy-preserving
consensus in multi-agent dynamical systems [31], networked
systems [32], and linear quadratic control for multi-agent
systems [11]. We point the reader to the review in [33], and
references therein for a detailed survey of recent develop-
ments using differential privacy in dynamical systems.
Differential privacy in the context of the satisfaction of
temporal objectives is a relatively recent area of research.
In [34], the authors introduced dpCTL∗, an extension of
the logic PCTL∗ augmented with a differentially private
operator. They presented a model-checking procedure to
verify differential privacy on Markov chains. The authors
assumed that actions are controlled by an adversary, which
is different from the setup in this paper. The authors of [10]
proposed a differentially private controller synthesis proce-
dure for multi-agent systems to satisfy a metric temporal
logic objective. In their setting, each agent added a noise
term while communicating its location to a local hub, which
in turn transmitted the information to a cloud controller that
determined the optimal inputs for each agent.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Linear Temporal Logic
Temporal logic frameworks enable the representation and
reasoning about temporal information on propositional state-
ments. Linear temporal logic (LTL) is one such framework,
where the progress of time is ‘linear’. An LTL formula [2]
is defined over a set of atomic propositions AP , and can be
written as ϕ := T|σ|¬ϕ|ϕ∧ϕ|Xϕ|ϕUϕ, where σ ∈ AP , and
X and U are temporal operators denoting the next and until
operations respectively. The semantics of LTL are defined
over (infinite) words in 2AP . We write η0η1 · · · := η |= ϕ
when a trace η ∈ (2AP)ω satisfies an LTL formula ϕ.
Definition 1 (LTL Semantics). Let ηi = ηiηi+1 . . . . Then,
the semantics of LTL can be recursively defined as:
1) η |= T if and only if (iff) η0 is true;
2) η |= σ iff σ ∈ η0;
3) η |= ¬ϕ iff η 6|= ϕ;
4) η |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff η |= ϕ1 and η |= ϕ2;
5) η |= Xϕ iff η1 |= ϕ;
6) η |= ϕ1Uϕ2 iff ∃j ≥ 0 such that ηj |= ϕ2 and for all
k < j, ηk |= ϕ1.
Moreover, the logic admits derived formulas of the form:
i) ϕ1 ∨ϕ2 := ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧¬ϕ2); ii) ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2 := ¬ϕ1 ∨ϕ2; iii)
Fϕ := TUϕ (eventually); iv) Gϕ := ¬F¬ϕ (always).
Definition 2 (Deterministic Rabin Automaton). A deter-
ministic Rabin automaton (DRA) is a quintuple RA =
(Q,Σ, κ, q0, F ) where Q is a nonempty finite set of states, Σ
is a finite alphabet, κ : Q×Σ→ Q is a transition function,
q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and F := {(L(i),K(i)}Mi=1 where
L(i),K(i) ⊆ Q for all i, and M is a positive integer.
A run ofRA is a sequence of states q0q1 . . . such that qi ∈
κ(qi−1, α) for all i and for some α ∈ Σ. The run is accepting
if for some (L,K) ∈ F , the run intersects with L finitely
many times, and with K infinitely often. An LTL formula ϕ
over AP can be represented by a DRA with alphabet 2AP
that accepts all and only those runs that satisfy ϕ.
B. Labeled Stochastic Games and Markov Chains
A stochastic game (SG) involves two players, and starts
with the system in a particular state. Transitions to subse-
quent states are probabilistically determined by the current
state and the actions chosen by each player.
Definition 3 (Stochastic Game). A stochastic game [15] is
a tuple G := (S,Udef , Uadv,T,AP,L). S is a finite set of
states, Udef and Uadv are finite sets of actions of the defender
and adversary. The function T : S×Udef×Uadv×S → [0, 1]
encodes T(s′|s, udef , uadv), the probability of transition
from state s to state s′ when defender and adversary actions
are udef and uadv . AP is a set of atomic propositions.
L : S → 2AP is a labeling function that maps a state to a
subset of atomic propositions that are satisfied in that state.
SGs can be viewed as an extension of Markov Decision
Processes (MDPs) when there is more than one player taking
an action. For a player in an SG, a policy is a mapping from
sequences of states to actions, if it is deterministic, or from
sequences of states to a probability distribution over actions,
if it is randomized. A policy is stationary if it is dependent
only on the most recent state. We denote the defender’s
policy by µ and the adversary’s policy by τ .
In this paper, we focus our attention on the Stackelberg
setting [35], where the first player (leader) commits to
a policy. The second player (follower) observes this and
chooses its policy as the best response to the leader’s policy,
defined as the policy that maximizes the follower’s utility. We
assume that the players take their actions concurrently at each
time step. We define the notion of a Stackelberg equilibrium
(SE), which indicates that a solution to a Stackelberg game
has been found. Let QL(l , f ) (QF (l , f )) be the utility gained
by the leader (follower) by adopting a policy l (f ).
Definition 4 (Stackelberg Equilibrium). A pair (l , f ) is a
Stackelberg equilibrium if l = arg maxl′ QL(l ′, BR(l ′)),
where BR(l ′) = {f : f = arg maxQF (l ′, f )}. That is, the
leader’s policy is optimal given that the follower observes
the leader’s policy and plays its best response.
Given µ and τ , G is a Markov chain (MC) [36]. For
s, s′ ∈ S, s′ is accessible from s, written s → s′, if
P(sa|s)P(sb|sa) . . .P(si|sj)P(s′|si) > 0 for some (finite
subset of) states sa, sb, . . . , si, sj . Two states communicate
if s→ s′ and s′ → s. Communicating classes of states cover
the state space of the MC. A state is transient if there is a
nonzero probability of not returning to it when we start from
that state, and is positive recurrent otherwise. In a finite state
MC, every state is either transient or positive recurrent. We
formally define labeled (discrete-time) Markov chains, and a
measure on this entity below.
Definition 5 (Labeled Markov Chain). A labeled Markov
chain is a tupleM = (S,T,AP,L), where S,AP,L are as
in Definition 3, and T : S × S → [0, 1] encodes P(s′|s)1. A
path on M is a sequence of states S = s0s1, . . . such that
si ∈ S and T(si+1, si) > 0 for all i. We write Paths(s) to
denote the set of paths in M that start from state s.
A labeled MDP is defined by augmenting a finite set
of actions Act to the Markov chain in Definition 5, and
redefining the transition function as T : S×Act×S → [0, 1]
to encode P(s′|s, a). A policy on this labeled MDP is a map
from sequences of states to actions (or, distributions over
actions). In order to distinguish between policies synthesized
to satisfy the LTL specification, and policies designed to
ensure differential privacy, we will refer to the latter as a
scheduler, denoted Γ, and the Markov chain so induced is
MΓ. In this paper, we will assume that the output of the
scheduler will depend only on the most recent state.
To quantitatively reason about M, we need to define an
appropriate probability space. We follow the treatment in
[2], and let the sample space be Paths(s). The set of events
F is the smallest σ−algebra on Paths(s) that contains all
cylinder sets2 spanned by finite length paths in M. Then,
there is a unique probability measure on M associated to
this σ−algebra. However, this measure is a value on the
cylinder sets. The next definition assigns a measure to an
arbitrary state of M [13], [14].
1We further assume that exactly one atomic proposition will be true in a
state of M. Therefore, L : S → AP . This is not restrictive since if labels
l1, l2 are true, we can define l12 = l1 ∧ l2, and augment l12 to L.
2The cylinder set of ω = s0s1 . . . , sn is Cyl(ω) := {ω′ ∈⋃
s Paths(s)|ω is a prefix of ω′}.
Definition 6 (Measure on s ∈ S in M). Let
T+(s0, s1, . . . , sk) =
∏k−1
i=0 P(si+1|si) and L+(s0, . . . , sk)
= L(s0) . . .L(sk). Then, for s ∈ S, νs : F → [0, 1] is the
unique measure on F such that for any cylinder set Cyl(ω),
νs(Cyl(ω)) =
∑{T+(p) : p ∈ Paths(s),L+(p) = ω}
C. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a property that ensures that private
data of an agent is protected, while allowing for statistical
inferences from aggregates of the data [37]. This makes it
unlikely that an adversary will learn anything meaningful
about sensitive data. Attractive features of differential privacy
include compositionality, resilience to post-processing, and
robustness to side information. The notion of differential
privacy that we use in this paper is defined over M.
Definition 7 ((, δ)−Differential Privacy). Let R ⊂ S × S
be a symmetric relation. Then, given  ≥ 0 and δ ∈ [0, 1],
a labeled Markov chain M is (, δ)−differentially private
with respect to R if for every s, s′ ∈ S such that (s, s′) ∈ R,
νs(E) ≤ eνs′(E) + δ for every measurable subset E ∈ F .
A measure of how different two states s, s′ ∈ S inM can
be quantified using the total variation distance, given by:
tv(s, s′) := tv(νs, νs′) = sup
E∈F
|νs(E)− νs′(E)|
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Problem 1. Given a stochastic game G representing the
environment, an LTL specification ϕ, and parameters , δ: i):
determine a defender policy µ to maximize the satisfaction
probability of ϕ under any adversary policy τ ; ii): determine
a symmetric relation R so that for any trajectory from i) that
satisfies ϕ, there is some other trajectory such that states s, s′
along the two trajectories are in R, and the two trajectories
are (, δ)−differentially private to an eavesdropper.
We consider two adversaries, each having different capa-
bilities. The first adversary can inject inputs into the system
in order to influence transitions between states in the CPS.
This sequence of inputs of this adversary is determined by
the policy τ in Problem 1. The second adversary is an
eavesdropper, who can observe trajectories of the system as
a result of the policy synthesized by the defender, and can
potentially use this information to launch an attack on the
system. Ensuring differential privacy of this aforementioned
trajectory will ensure that states along the trajectory are
relatively indistinguishable to this eavesdropper.
Assumption 1. The two adversaries act independent of each
other, and do not communicate with each other.
V. SOLUTION APPROACH
We adopt a two-step approach to solve Problem 1. In the
first step, we will determine a defender policy to maximize
the probability of satisfying the LTL objective under any
adversary policy. In the second step, we will use optimal
policies that satisfy ϕ from the previous step to define a sym-
metric relation R on the states to ensure (, δ)−differential
privacy of a labeled trajectory observed by the eavesdropper.
We will impose an additional constraint on the ‘closeness’
of policies from states that are ‘related’ to each other
(this will be made precise later in this section) to ensure
differential privacy of subsequent states along the trajectory
while maintaining satisfaction of the LTL objective.
The representation of the environment when composed
with that of ϕ yields a product game. For an instantiation
of defender and adversary policies, this is a Markov chain.
These policies will induce paths on the Markov chain, and
we want to ensure differential privacy of states along these
paths. We will use a fragment of the temporal logic PCTL*
[2] to reason about probabilities over paths on this entity.
A. Synthesis of Policies to Satisfy LTL Objective
In order to find runs on G that would be accepted by the
DRA RA corresponding to the LTL task ϕ, we construct an
entity that composes representations of the environment (G)
and the goal (RA). We call this a product game.
Definition 8 (Product Stochastic Game (PSG)). Given SG
G and DRA RA corresponding to LTL formula ϕ, a
PSG is a tuple Gϕ := (Sϕ, Udef , Uadv,Tϕ, Fϕ,AP,Lϕ),
where Sϕ = S × Q, Tϕ((s′, q′)|(s, q), udef , uadv) =
T(s′|s, udef , uadv) iff δ(q,L(s′)) = q′ and 0 otherwise,
Fϕ := {(Lϕ(i),Kϕ(i)}Mi=1 is such that Lϕ(i),Kϕ(i) ⊆ Sϕ,
and (s, q) ∈ Lϕ(i) iff q ∈ L(i) and (s, q) ∈ Kϕ(i) iff
q ∈ K(i), Lϕ((s, q)) = L(s).
As a first step, we are interested in the synthesis of
defender policies that would satisfy the LTL objective under
any adversary policy. This will be equivalent to reaching
certain recurrent subsets of a Markov chain formed under
instantiations of these policies. Maximizing the probability
of satisfaction in this setting corresponds to reaching an
equilibrium of a zero-sum Stackelberg game between the
defender and adversary. A careful justification of this asser-
tion with detailed proofs for fully and partially observable
environments has been studied in our earlier works [15]–
[18]. We only state relevant results that will be useful in our
goal to further establish differential privacy of trajectories in
Gϕ that will satisfy ϕ under the respective agent policies.
Proposition 1. Let v(s, q) = max
µ
min
τ
P(ϕ|µ, τ, (s, q)).
Then,
v(s, q) = max
µ
min
τ
∑
ud∈Udef
∑
ua∈Uadv
∑
(s′,q′)∈Sϕ
µ(udef |(s, q))
× τ(uadv|(s, q))Tϕ((s′, q′)|(s, q), udef , uadv)v((s′, q′))
Proof. The proof can be found in Lemma 1 of [16].
Let E denote the set of accepting states of Gϕ. That is,
a subset of recurrent states of the stochastic game which
also satisfy ϕ. We note that in the terminology of [15],
[16] this set is part of a generalized maximal accepting
end component, while [17], [18] use the term ϕ− feasible
recurrent set. Let P(reach E|s, µ, τ) denote the probability
of reaching the set of states E in Gϕ. We have the following
result for stationary policies µ, τ .
Theorem 1. For a stationary defender policy µ, and initial
state s, the following holds:
min
τ
P(Gϕ |= ϕ|s, µ, τ) = min
τ
P(reach E|s, µ, τ)
Proof. The proof can be found in Proposition 3 of [16]. An
analogous result for the partially observable state setting can
be found in Theorem 4.3 of [17].
Therefore, the problem of maximizing the probability of
satisfaction of ϕ under any adversary policy is equivalent to
reaching a subset of states under these policies of the product
game Gϕ that composes representations of the environment
and the LTL objective. Moreover, results in [15]–[18] estab-
lish convergence of these policies to an equilibrium of the
Stackelberg game between the defender and adversary.
B. The Temporal Logic PCTL*
The semantics of LTL, as seen in Definition 1 are defined
over infinite words. In order to establish differential privacy,
we require a means to reason over paths in a Markov chain
or Markov decision process. This temporal logic PCTL*
is appropriate in this setting. A PCTL* formula comprises
state and path formulas and its semantics are expressed over
Markov chains or MDPs. We will work with a fragment of
PCTL* whose path formulas are LTL formulas.
An PCTL* state formula [2] is defined over a set of atomic
propositions AP , and can be written as: Φ := T|σ|¬Φ|Φ ∧
Φ|PJ(φ), where φ is a path formula, which is an LTL
formula whose sub-state formulas are PCTL* state formulas.
This is formed according to φ := Φ|¬φ|φ ∧ φ|Xφ|φUφ,
where Φ is a PCTL* state formula. J ⊆ [0, 1] is a non-empty
interval with rational end points. The semantics of PCTL*
are expressed over an MDP MΓ, where Γ is a scheduler. In
the sequel, we omit the superscript Γ, and use it only when
the context will not be clear otherwise.
Definition 9 (PCTL* Semantics). The semantics of PCTL*
state formula are defined on states of a labeled MDPM as:
1) (M, s) |= T iff Paths(s) is true for all s
2) (M, s) |= σ iff σ ∈ L(s0)
3) (M, s) |= ¬Φ iff (M, s) 6|= Φ
4) (M, s) |= Φ1∧Φ2 iff (M, s) |= Φ1 and (M, s) |= Φ2.
5) (M, s) |= PΓJ(φ) iffM, P[(MΓ, s) |= φ] ∈ J for some
scheduler Γ.
The semantics of PCTL* path formulas are defined as:
1) (M,S ) |= Φ iff (M, s0) |= Φ
2) (M,S ) |= Xφ iff (M, Paths(s1)) |= φ
3) (M,S ) |= φ1Uφ2 iff ∃j ≥ 0 such that
(M, Paths(sj)) |= φ2 and for all k <
j, (M, Paths(sk)) |= φ1.
Problem 1 can then be interpreted as finding a defender
policy to satisfy ϕ under any adversary policy, and then
synthesizing a scheduler so that (, δ)−differential privacy
holds for states along trajectories generated according to the
policies in the previous step. The scheduler will be related to
defining a symmetric relation between states, and ensuring
that policies computed at these states are ‘close’ to each
other so that subsequent states along the trajectories remain
related. In this manner, the original objective of maximizing
the probability of satisfying ϕ will also not be affected.
C. Distances between States and Differential Privacy
The eavesdropper observes a sequence of labels, corre-
sponding to labels on states along a trajectory. The eaves-
dropper is also assumed to have access to optimal defender
policies at each state synthesized in the previous step. Infor-
mally, a trajectory will be differentially private if at each state
along the trajectory, the adversary will be unable to associate
a unique state s = L−1(l), where L−1 : 2AP → 2S .
To capture the relation between the notion of differential
privacy in Definition 7 and paths in a Markov chain, we use
the notion of a skewed distance from [13].
Definition 10 (Skewed Total Variation Distance). For α ≥ 1,
the skewed distance is a quantity ∆α : R≥0 × R≥0 → R≥0
such that ∆α(x, y) := max{x−αy, y−αx, 0}. Then, given
s, s′ ∈ S, the skewed total variation distance is
tvα(s, s
′) := tvα(νs, νs′) = sup
E∈F
∆α(νs(E), νs′(E))
This gives the following result [13]:
Proposition 2. The labeled MC M is (, δ)−differentially
private with respect to R ⊂ S×S if for every s, s′ ∈ S such
that (s, s′) ∈ R, we have tvα(s, s′) ≤ δ, where α = e.
To establish differential privacy, we have to define a
notion of equivalence on states of the MDP (or Markov
chain) so that they are indistinguishable from each other.
We use a skewed variant of the Kantorovich distance3 [26]
to translate the distance between MDP states to a distance
over probability measures [28]. This is needed since the
consequence of taking an action in a state often yields a
distribution over the next state, which is why we need to
‘lift’ tvα from a relation over states to one over distributions.
Definition 11 (Skewed Kantorovich Metric). Let ω, ω′ be
probability distributions over states S of an MDPM. Then,
given a symmetric distance d : S × S → [0, 1], the skewed
Kantorovich distance between ω and ω′, Kdα(ω, ω
′), is the
maximum value of a pair of linear programs- the first is
given below; the second is got by reversing ω and ω′:
max
xs
∑
s∈S
(ω(s)− αω′(s))xs (1)
subject to: xs − αxs′ ≤ d(s, s′), for all s, s′ ∈ S
0 ≤ xs ≤ 1, for all s ∈ S
Lemma 1. [13] Let d(s, s′) = I 6=(s, s′), where I 6= takes
value 1 if its arguments are not equal, and 0 otherwise. Then
Kdα(ω, ω
′) = tvα(s, s′).
3This metric has its origins in optimal transportation theory, but has since
been used in several applications in computer science [38].
D. Value Iteration for Differential Privacy
The approach we take is to ensure that differential privacy
will hold at each state of the trajectory, starting from the
initial state. To achieve this, we define a symmetric relation
between states in a recursive manner. We further stipulate
that at related states, optimal defender policies synthesized in
the previous step are close to each other, and that subsequent
states resulting from these policies be related. We formalize
this approach and prove relevant results in this section.
We recall standard terminology from the MDP literature
[39]. The value of a state s under scheduler Γ is V Γ(s) :=
E[
∑∞
t=0 β
trt|s0 = s,Γ], where s0 is the initial state, β ∈
(0, 1) is a discount factor, and rt is a reward received at
time t. The expectation is taken over the transitions of state
induced by Γ. The goal is to determine Γ to maximize V Γ(s)
for each s. The optimal value function V ∗ will then satisfy
the Bellman optimality equations, given by:
V ∗(s) = max
a∈A
(ras + β
∑
s1∈S
P(s1|s, a)V ∗(s1)),∀s ∈ S (2)
Lemma 2. [39] Let V0(s) = 0 and Vn+1(s) =
max
a∈A
(ras + β
∑
s1∈S P(s1|s, a)Vn(s1). Then, {Vn(s)}n≥1
converges uniformly to V ∗(s) for each s ∈ S.
Since our treatment is related to maximizing the satisfac-
tion probability, we will assume that ras = 0 at all states
other than accepting states of the product game (where this
reward will be set to 1). In this case, the value of a state will
be related to the probability of satisfying the LTL goal, and
therefore will be in [0, 1]. Consequently, we can set β = 1.
Define an operator Ftvα as follows:
Ftvα(s, s
′) :=
{
max
a∈A
(tvα(s, s
′)) L(s) = L(s′)
1 L(s) 6= L(s′)
Let Fntvα denote the composition of Ftvα n times.
Theorem 2. ∆α(Vn(s), Vn(s′)) ≤ Fntvα(s, s′) ∀s, s′ ∈ S.
Proof. From the definition of Ftvα(s, s
′), the claim clearly
holds when L(s) 6= L(s′). Now, let L(s) = L(s′). Since
V0(s) = 0 for all s, the base case of the induction holds.
Now, suppose ∆α(Vk(s)− Vk(s′)) ≤ F ktvα(s, s′) is true for
some k. Then, we have:
Vk+1(s)− αVk+1(s′)
= max
a
[
∑
u∈S
P(u|s, a)Vn(u)]− αmax
a
[
∑
u∈S
P(u|s′, a)Vk(u)]
≤ max
a
[
∑
u∈S
(P(u|s, a)− αP(u|s′, a))Vk(u)]
Writing down the above set of inequalities for Vk+1(s′) −
αVk+1(s), we observe that Vk(u) is a feasible solution to the
skewed Kantorovich metric tvkα(s, s
′) (Definition 11). There-
fore, we get: ∆α(Vk+1(s)−Vk+1(s′)) ≤ maxa[tvkα(s, s′)] =
Ftvα(F
k
tvα(s, s
′)) = F k+1tvα (s, s
′), completing the proof.
Proposition 3. Let F ∗tvα(s, s
′) be the least fix point of
Ftvα(s, s
′). As n→∞, ∆α(V ∗(s), V ∗(s′)) ≤ F ∗tvα(s, s′).
Proof. This follows from the fact that in Kdα(ω, ω
′), if we
equip d : S × S → [0, 1] with a point-wise ordering,
we get a complete lattice. When Kdα(ω, ω
′) = tvα(s, s′),
then Ftvα(s, s
′) is monotone with respect to this order.
Consequently, it admits a least fixed point [40].
These results allow us to aggregate related states. Further,
we restrict the actions (the set A in Equation (2)) to those
determined by the optimal defender policy µ∗, where µ∗ :=
arg max
µ
min
τ
P(ϕ). If µ∗(s) denotes the actions available at
state s per the policy µ∗, we write A(s) := {a : a ∈ µ∗(s)}.
Assumption 2. Assume that at each non-terminal state s
along the trajectory that satisfies ϕ, there is some action a
such that the LTL objective will be satisfied.
Assumption 2 stipulates that trajectories that will be gen-
erated according to the policies µ∗ in Section V-A satisfy the
LTL objective with non-zero probability. A more thorough
analysis of ensuring differential privacy of trajectories that
may not satisfy the LTL goal at all is left as future work.
In the sequel, we abuse notation to say that a state of
the labeled MDP is a terminal state if it corresponds to an
accepting state of the product game formed by composing
representations of the environment and the LTL objective.
Theorem 3. Consider a symmetric relation R defined recur-
sively as: (s, s′) ∈ R if and only if:
1) L(s) = L(s′),
2) tv(µ∗(s), µ∗(s′)) ≤M where M << 1/α,
3) ∃u, u′ ∈ S, as ∈ µ∗(s), as′ ∈ µ∗(s′) such that
P(u|s, as) > 0,P(u′|s′, as′) > 0, and (u, u′) ∈ R
for all non-terminal states u, u′,
4) tvα(s, s′) = 0 for terminal states s, s′.
Consider two trajectories, one starting from s0 ∈ S, and the
other from s′0 ∈ S. Then, if (s0, s′0) ∈ R, each state along
the two trajectories, written (s, s′), will be (, δ)−differential
private for α = e if δ ≥ αM + max
(s,s′)∈R
F ∗tvα(s, s
′).
Proof. F ∗tvα(s, s
′) ≥ tvα(s, s′) since F ∗tvα is a least fixed-
point. From Thm. 2 and Proposition 3, ∆α(V ∗(s), V ∗(s′))
≤ F ∗tvα(s, s′). The second condition for R allows us to relax
the requirement that the optimal action from s and that from
s′ is the same. This will allow two states to be related if
the optimal (stochastic) defender policies from these states
are ‘close’ to each other. The third condition ensures that
these policies lead to transitions to states that will also be
related to each other. Now, since V ∗(s) = maxΓ P(ϕ|s),
where Γ comprises actions from µ∗, ∆α(V ∗(s), V ∗(s′)) is
|P(ϕ|Paths(s)) − αP(ϕ|Paths(s′))|. This is the same as
tvα(s, s
′), but along measurable sets determined by Γ. From
Proposition 2, we want this quantity, plus an additional term
that accounts for the closeness of optimal policies to be less
than δ. Therefore, δ ≥ F ∗tvα(s, s′) + αM . The recursive
definition of R requires that this property be maintained at
every subsequent state until a terminal state is reached. The
lower bound on δ is got by taking the maximum over least
fixed points corresponding to each pair of related states.
In Theorem 3, we compare trajectories of equal lengths.
The length of a trajectory is the number of actions in the
trajectory, plus one (for the initial state). Future work will
study differential privacy for trajectories of different lengths.
Remark 1. Computing tvα(s, s′) is not known to be de-
cidable [41]. However, in our setting, since V (s) = P(ϕ|s),
Theorems 2, 3, and Proposition 3 will allow us to circumvent
the need to explicitly compute tvα(·, ·).
VI. EXAMPLE
We consider a CPS in the form of a drone/ UAV that has
to carry out persistent surveillance of a target region. At the
same time, it must avoid certain regions of the environment.
This could be either due to the presence of a physical
obstacle, or other factors that might compromise it (e.g.
entering a region might allow the drone to be detected by a
radar). This goal can be represented by the LTL formula ϕ =
GFtar ∧G¬obs, where tar and obs are labels denoting
the target and obstacle respectively. The DRA corresponding
to ϕ will have two states q0, q1, with F = ({∅}, {q1}).
The dynamics model of the UAV motion is inspired from
[12]. The satisfaction of ϕ can be affected by an adversary
that can influence trajectories of the UAV. A stochastic-game
abstraction of the UAV dynamics was presented in [16], and
we will assume that we have this abstraction for the remain-
der of this section. The environment of the drone is then an
M×N grid, S := {si : i = x+My, x ∈ {0, . . . ,M−1}, y ∈
{0, . . . , N − 1}}. We assume that the drone’s actions are
Udef = {R,L,U,D} denoting right, left, up, and down, and
the actions of the adversary are Uadv = {A,NA}, denoting
attack, and not attack respectively. Transition probabilities
for (udef , uadv) = (R,NA) and (R,A) are defined below.
Probabilities for other action pairs can be defined similarly.
Let Nsi denote the neighbors of si.
T(sj |si, R,NA) =

0.8 j = i+ 1, (i+ 1) 6≡ 0 mod M
0.2
|Nsi |
(sj ∈ {si} ∪ Nsi \ {si+1}),
(i+ 1) 6≡ 0 mod M
1 j = i and (i+ 1) ≡ 0 mod M
T(sj |si, R,A) =

0.6 j = i+ 1, (i+ 1) 6≡ 0 mod M
0.4
|Nsi |
(sj ∈ {si} ∪ Nsi \ {si+1}),
(i+ 1) 6≡ 0 mod M
1 j = i and i+ 1 ≡ 0 mod M
We use the method from Section V-A to synthesize a
drone policy that will maximize its probability of satisfying
this objective under any adversary policy. Once this has
been done, we want to ensure that a second, independent
adversary eavesdrops on a labeled trajectory that satisfies the
LTL objective, will not be able to discern the position of the
drone. We use the skewed total variation distance in order
to establish differential privacy of the trajectory at each state
along the trajectory. Specifically, two states will be related
if they satisfy the conditions in Theorem 3.
We report results of our experiments for M = N = 10,
as shown in Figure 1. In the first step, using the results in
Fig. 1: The environment as a 10×10 grid. The objective for
the CPS, given by the LTL formula ϕ = GFtar∧G¬obs, is
to visit the target (green state) infinitely often while always
avoiding obstacles (red states). The CPS has to satisfy ϕ
in the presence of an adversary who can insert inputs that
affect transitions between successive states. After a trajectory
that satisfies ϕ has been realized, a second eavesdropper
adversary should not be to distinguish this trajectory from
trajectories ‘sufficiently close’ to it. We use differential
privacy as a metric to decide if the latter objective will be
satisfied. The figure shows a fragment of length 25 of two
trajectories that satisfy ϕ and are differentially private for
 = 1, δ = 0.001. The trajectories start from states that
are related to each other, and at each state, the distance
between the optimal defender policies at the states is below a
threshold, and subsequent states are related to each other. An
eavesdropper will not be able to distinguish between these
trajectories only by observing labels on the states.
Fig. 2: Number of trajectories differentially private to one
satisfying trajectory for different values of  and δ. Larger 
and δ allow for more differentially private trajectories.
Section V-A, we synthesize a policy for the defender that will
maximize the probability of satisfying ϕ under any adversary
policy. We consider a trajectory that satisfies ϕ, and use
results in Sections V-C and V-D to observe the effects of
values of  and δ on the number of differentially private
trajectories that can be realized. Specifically, different values
of  and δ will yield varying numbers of differentially private
trajectories, under an additional assumption that the optimal
defender policies at states which are related to each other are
sufficiently close. In particular, we observe that larger values
of  and δ allow for more differentially private trajectories, as
seen in Figure 2. Figure 1 also shows a fragment of length 25
of two trajectories that are (1, 0.001)−differentially private.
That is, by simply observing labels on the states, and with
knowledge of the optimal defender policies at each state,
with high probability, the eavesdropper adversary will not
be able to distinguish between the two trajectories.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a solution to the problem of ensuring
satisfaction of an LTL objective ϕ while maintaining privacy
of trajectories in the presence of two kinds of adversaries. We
modeled the interaction between the CPS and an adversary
who could tamper with actuator inputs as a stochastic game.
Maximizing the probability of satisfying ϕ under actions
of this adversary was equivalent to reaching a Stackelberg
equilibrium of this game. We then characterized the indistin-
guishability of trajectories to an eavesdropper and showed a
way to ensure differential privacy of states along trajectories
that satisfied ϕ. We showed that if a distance between the
probabilities of satisfying of ϕ starting from states that were
related to each other was below a threshold, then this ensured
that these states were differentially private. An additional
requirement on the distance between optimal policies at
related states ensured differential privacy at every state along
the trajectories. We validated our approach on a simulation
of a UAV that had to satisfy an LTL objective in the presence
of adversarial inputs in an environment with an eavesdropper.
Future directions of research include generalizing our
setup to the goal of ensuring differential privacy of trajecto-
ries that may not satisfy ϕ.
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